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Abstract
In this paper it is shown that the setting up of a social housing
system may decrease the total number of houses built in the market,
induce a price of non-social houses greater than the price of houses
without that system and increase the proﬁts of housing developers
even in situations where they have to sell social houses at a price below
production cost. The analysis considers a situation with imperfect
competition in the housing market and with a social housing system
where housing developers must provide some social houses when they
obtain a permit to build non-social houses.
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11 Introduction
Social housing intends to provide aﬀordable housing for poor households.
The direct and administrative costs of social housing for the government
are, however, very high. This work points to a diﬀerent possibility for social
housing, that may be considered when housing developers have market power
in the housing market: a social housing system where housing developers
must provide some social houses when they obtain a permit to build non-
social houses. The regulator would determine the number of social houses to
build, their price and the maximum income level that a household may have
to be eligible for a social house.
In the analysis of housing markets it is often implicitly assumed that
there is perfect competition in housing supply. However, this is not correct
in most local housing markets. These markets can be approximated by
districts or cities which are far enough apart for only local supply and demand
conditions to aﬀect prices and output, and the number of housing developers
in each market is often limited. This work considers that there is imperfect
competition in each housing market and, hence, that housing developers have
market power.
It is generally accepted that if housing developers are required to sell social
houses at a price below cost, they will have to be compensated. However,
in this work it is shown that, under imperfect competition, the setting up of
a social housing system, combined with permits to build non-social houses,
may increase the expected proﬁts of housing developers, even if they have
to sell social houses at a price below production cost. Hence, the design of
the social housing system may be such that no direct government funding is
required.
There has been a long debate on the eﬀects of social housing on house
building.1 In this paper it is shown that the setting up of a social housing
system as the one described above may decrease the total number of houses
built in the market. Moreover, even if the total number of houses built
increases with the social housing system, the price of a non-social house may
be greater than the price of a house when there is not social housing.
For the results it is necessary to assume that the households eligible for
a social house are not only for those who cannot aﬀord to buy a house when
there is not social housing. In this paper it is considered that the regulator
1See, for instance, Sinai and Waldfogel (2005).
2requires the allocation of social houses to households with income below
some ﬁxed income level. However, there are more households eligible for a
social house than the number of social houses available. Then the available
social houses are allocated at random among the eligible households.2 The
regulator could eliminate the excess demand of social houses by reducing the
maximum income level that qualiﬁes for a social house. But he prefers to
maintain that excess demand. A reason for this preference may be that there
is asymmetric information on household income between the regulator and
each household, as a consequence of some non uniformly distributed fraud in
income disclosure among households.
To obtain the results it suﬃces to use a one period (static) model with
linear demand for housing services and Cournot competition among housing
developers. As in a one period model there is no diﬀerence between renting
and selling, the analysis applies to situations where social houses are rented
and also to situations where social houses are sold. The presentation will
consider this latter case.3
The intuition for the results is the following: When there are not social
houses the number of houses built is above the monopoly level. Producers
would beneﬁt from a reduction in total production towards the monopoly
level. But they cannot collude and agree on that lower quantity (commitment
to collude may not be feasible and collusion is not allowed). Social housing
may make up for the lack of ability of producers to coordinate on a lower
production level in the market of non-social houses. In particular, social
housing may induce an increase in the proﬁts of housing developers, even if
they must sell social houses at a price below production cost.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model.
Section 3 analyzes the consequences of the setting up of a social housing
system. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2B a s i c m o d e l
To proceed, consider an oligopolistic housing industry with n ≥ 2 housing
developers that compete àl aC o u r n o t . Entry into the industry is assumed to
2Diﬀerent ways to allocate social houses among eligible households have been used in
practice. See Olsen (2003) and Sinai and Waldfogel (2005).
3The simultaneous consideration of renting and selling as diﬀerentiated alternatives
requires a dynamic model where houses are a durable good.
3be unproﬁtable. Each housing developer builds houses only on one particular
site and all sites for housing development are homogeneous.4
The presentation considers that substitution eﬀects between new houses
and houses built in the past are negligible and, hence, the analysis centers in
the market of new houses. It is assumed that all new houses oﬀered in the
market are identical from the consumer‘s point of vue. The inverse demand
function for new houses is: p = a − bQ,w h e r eQ represents the quantity of
new houses in the market. Hence, there are
a−p
b households that are willing
to pay at least p for a new house. The marginal cost of production of each
ﬁrm, represented by c with 0 <c<a , is constant. The demand function for
new houses and the cost of production are known by households and housing
developers. Finally, housing developers are neutral to risk.
When there is a signiﬁcant substitution eﬀect between used and new
houses the results in the paper still follow. If there exist U used houses and
a used house is equivalent to a proportion β of a new house with 0 <β≤ 1
(the value of a used house for a buyer is a proportion β of the value of a
new house for that buyer), the analysis below will remain valid using as the
inverse housing demand function for new houses
a − bQ − bβU =¯ a − bQ.
where ¯ a = a−bβU. In this case a used house might be sold at a price equal
to the price of the new house multiplied by β.
When there is not a social housing system each active housing developer
i, i =1 ,...,n, will solve the following problem:
max
qi




qi.T h eﬁrst order condition of this problem is:
a − bQ − c − bqi =0 .







4Assume that the extension of a site is big enough to allow several-story buildings to be
built on it. Hence, a site is bigger than a lot, and it may be seen as closer to a subdivision.
4Hence,
p
∗ = a − bQ







3S o c i a l h o u s i n g
Consider now a situation where the regulator establishes that housing
developers must sell D social houses (D
n houses each housing developer) at
ap r i c ee q u a lt or,w i t hD<a−r
b . Moreover, each housing developer is free
to decide the number of non-social houses to build on his site, besides the
D
n social houses required by the regulator. We may consider that there is
a zone in each site where social houses are built or assume that all social
houses are built in some particular sites and each housing developer has a
site for building only non-social houses.
In this work the cost of production of social houses is the same as the
cost of production of non-social houses. However, if the quality of social
houses were smaller than the quality of non-social houses, the former would
be cheaper to produce. It is immediate to prove that the results obtained
below will hold if the marginal cost of each social house is smaller than c.
The regulator requires the allocation of social houses to households with
incomes below some ﬁxed income level. Assuming that the valuation of
housing services increases with income, consider that the limit in the income
level established to be eligible for a social house implies that social houses
are assigned to households with willingness to pay for the services of a house
smaller than m,w i t hr<m<a .5 Assume also that it is r<p ∗ = a+nc
n+1 <m .
This implies that some households that would buy a house without social
housing are eligible for social houses.
Consider, ﬁnally, that there are more than D households eligible for
as o c i a lh o u s e( m−r
b >D ).6 The regulator prefers not to eliminate the
excess demand of social houses by reducing the maximum income level that
qualiﬁes for a social house. The reason may be that there is asymmetric
information on household income between the regulator and each household,
5Hence, the social housing policy considered in this work is a policy of the kind
considered in Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982): a targeting policy. However, sometimes
the social housing policy is more a policy of the type suggested by Akerlof (1978): a
tagging policy, that classiﬁes households according to characteristics over which they have
no control (disability or age, for instance).
6Households with willingness to pay for a house smaller than r will not ask for a social
house.
5as a consequence of a non uniformly distributed fraud in income disclosure
among households. The available social houses are then allocated at random
among the eligible households. The probability of obtaining a social house for
an eligible household is equal to bD
m−r. As expected, this probability decreases
with m and increases with D and with r.
Let us denote by Qn the quantity of non-social houses built. Note that
Qn < a−r
b −D is required to have non-social houses that are more expensive
than social houses. If 0 <Q n ≤ a−m
b the price of non-social houses will be
a − bQn (the same as without social housing). The reason is that, in this
case, there are not households eligible for a social house who are willing to
pay the price of non-social houses (a − bQn ≥ a − ba−m
b = m).
Let us consider now that a−m
b <Q n < a−r
b − D. I nt h i sc a s et h ep r i c e
of non-social houses will be, in general, smaller than a − bQn.T h e r e a s o n
is that the households with willingness to pay for a house between a − bQn
and m are eligible for a social house and some of them may obtain a social
house. The price of non-social houses will, thus, depend on the result of the
allocation process of social houses. As these houses are allocated at random
among the eligible households the price of non-social houses for Qn between
a−m
b and a−r
b − D might take many diﬀerent values. Hence, that price will
be a random variable: ˜ pn.7 However, as housing developers are neutral to
risk they will take into account only the expected price of non-social houses,
E(˜ pn).
The expected price of non-social houses when a−m
b <Q n < a−r
b − D is
given by the price of non-social houses that is obtained when social houses
happen to be distributed among the eligible households in a particular way.
This particular distribution corresponds to the case where social houses are
distributed among the eligible households with diﬀerent willingness to pay
for a house in proportion to their relative numbers. That is, for any x and y
such that m>y>x≥ r, the proportion of households with willingness to
pay for a house between x and y that obtain a social house is equal to the
probability that any eligible household has of obtaining a social house ( bD
m−r).
With that particular distribution of social houses among the eligible
7If the eligible households with higher willingness to pay are the ones that obtain the
social houses, the price of non-social houses required to sell the Qn non-social houses
will have to be smaller than for other distributions of social houses among the eligible
households. The contrary will occur if the eligible households with lower willingness to
pay are the ones that obtain the social houses.
6households, the number of non-social houses sold at a price p of non-social





m−r).8 Hence, if Qn non-social
houses are built, with a−m
b <Q n < a−r
b −D, the expected price of non-social
houses, E(˜ pn(Qn)), will be such that
Q
n =
a − E(˜ pn(Qn))
b
−










a(m − r) − mbD
m − r − bD
−
b(m − r)
m − r − bD
Q
n.
Therefore, the expected inverse demand function for non-social houses








b ≤ Qn < a−r
b − D,
a − bQn for Qn ≤ a−m
b .
As r<p ∗ = a+nc
n+1 <m , we have from the analysis in section 2 that the
equilibrium price of non-social houses, when there is social housing, will be at
most m. The equilibrium in the market of non-social houses may correspond
to a corner solution, with the expected price of non-social houses equal to
m, or to an interior solution, with the expected price of non-social houses
in the interval (r,m).T oo b t a i nt h i si n t e r i o rs o l u t i o nw ep r o c e e da si nt h e
previous section using
a(m−r)−mbD
m−r−bD instead of a,a n d
b(m−r)
m−r−bD instead of b,a n d
assuming that the situation is such that the n housing developers remain





















a + nc +
(a − m)bD











b households that are willing to pay between p
and m for a new house.
9We have to add the term (r − c)D
n to the total proﬁts of each ﬁrm, but the (interior)
solution in the market of non-social houses does not depend on this additional term, as
long as the n ﬁrms remain active.
10Note that r+b D<m<aimplies (a−c)(m−r)−(m−c)bD ≥ (a−c)(m−r−bD) > 0
and qn∗
i > 0.
11Note that the price of non-social houses for a particular allocation at random of social
houses may be below p∗. Consider, for instance, that the eligible households with greater
willingness to pay for a house are the ones that obtain a social house. Then if m is well
above p∗, the price of non-social houses might be a−bD+nc
n+1 <p ∗.
7The interior solution given by (1) and (2) requires E(˜ pn)∗ ≤ m.I f h





n+1 >mthe corner solution pnc = m and qnc
i = a−m
bn
will be obtained. From (1) we have that the quantity of non social houses
increases with m and decreases with D and with r. From (2) we have that
the expected price of non social houses decreases with m and increases with
D and with r.
















m + nc − (n +1 ) r
(m − r)(n +1 )
D.
Hence, it cannot be guaranteed that the setting up of a social housing system
as the one considered in this paper will increase the total number of houses
built, even considering a linear demand function for houses (the number of
houses built will increase in that case if and only if m + nc > (n +1 ) r). We
have:
Proposition 1 The setting up of a social housing system may reduce the
total number of houses built in the market.
The variation in expected proﬁts of housing developers with the setting




∗ =( ( a + nc +
(a − m)bD




















a(m − r)(a − 2m)+c(m − r − bD)(2m − c)+bDm2
(m − r − bD)(m − r)(n +1 )
2 +(r −c)D. (3)
Therefore, the setting up of a social housing system may increase the expected
proﬁts of housing developers (for instance, when r ≥ c and a ≥ 2m it is
ˆ π
∗ − π∗ > 0). Moreover, from (3) we have that the expected proﬁts of
housing developers may increase even if r<c , that is, even in situations
where they have to sell social houses at a price below production cost. A
social housing system will be neutral with respect to the proﬁts of housing
developers if the expression in (3) is equal to 0.W ec o n c l u d e :
Proposition 2 The setting up of a social housing system may increase the
expected proﬁts of housing developers, even if social houses have to be sold at
a price below production cost.
8The intuition behind Propositions 1 and 2 is the following: When there
are not social houses the number of houses built is above the monopoly
level as there is Cournot competition among housing developers. Producers
would beneﬁt from a reduction in total production towards the monopoly
level. But they cannot collude and agree on that lower quantity. With
the setting up of a social housing system the expected proﬁts of housing
developers may increase. This increase in proﬁts of housing developers may
occur even if they must sell social houses at a price below production cost and
although, at the relevant prices for interior solutions, the expected demand
curve for non-social houses is on the left of the demand curve for houses
without social housing. Hence, social housing may make up for the lack of
ability of producers to coordinate on a lower production level in the market
of non-social houses and, thus, housing developers may favor the setting up
of a social housing system of the type discussed in this work.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This work has considered a housing market where there is imperfect
competition in the supply of houses and a social housing system where
housing developers must provide some social houses when they obtain a
permit to build non-social houses. The regulator determines the number
of social houses to build, their price and the maximum income level that a
household may have to be eligible for a social house. The number of housing
developers is given to the regulator.
The results obtained explain why these social housing systems must be
designed carefully in this context. First, the total number of houses built
may decrease with the social housing system. Even if the total number of
houses built increases with that system, the price of a non-social house may
be greater than the price of a house without social housing. A price of a
non-social house greater than the price of a house without social housing
implies that some eligible households that do not obtain a social house, and
were able to buy a house when there was not social housing, will not be able
to aﬀord the purchase of a non-social house when the social housing system
is established.
The setting up of a social housing system may also increase the expected
proﬁts of housing developers and this may occur even if social houses are
9sold at a price below production cost. In this latter case, there would be a
cross subsidy from the buyers of non-social houses to households that obtain
a social house.
In this context housing developers may try to convince the regulator
to design a social housing system proﬁtable for them.12 As imperfect
competition allows for designs of the social housing system that are proﬁtable
for housing developers, no direct government funding is required.13 However,
in that case the buyers of non-social houses would pay for the increase in
proﬁts of housing developers.
If the regulator has enough information, he may design a social housing
system neutral with respect to the proﬁts of housing developers. The design
of the social housing system may even be used as a peculiar competition
policy. As without that system housing developers have positive proﬁts,
there may be social housing systems of the type considered in this paper
that may serve to reduce the proﬁts of housing developers. The reason is
that social houses are an alternative to non-social houses for some (or many)
eligible households that could aﬀord to buy a non-social house and, thus,
the situation becomes analogous to one where housing developers face more
competition in the housing market. There may even exist social housing
systems that limit the proﬁts of housing developers and assign social houses
in a way that implies a price of non-social houses smaller than the price of
houses without social housing.
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